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ABSTRACT
The performance of Content-Based Image Retrieval Systems
(CBIRS) is typically evaluated via benchmarking their ca-
pacity to match images despite various generic distortions
such as crops, rescalings or Picture in Picture (PiP) attacks,
which are the most challenging. Distortions are made in a
very generic manner, by applying a set of transformations
that are completely independent from the systems later per-
forming recognition tasks. Recently, studies have shown that
exploiting the finest details of the various techniques used
in a CBIRS offers the opportunity to create distortions that
dramatically reduce the recognition performance. Such a
security perspective is taken in this paper. Instead of cre-
ating generic PiP distortions, it proposes a creation scheme
able to delude the recognition capabilities of a CBIRS that
is representative of state of the art techniques as it relies on
SIFT, high-dimensional k-nearest neighbors searches and ge-
ometrical robustification steps. Experiments using 100,000
real-world images confirm the effectiveness of these security-
oriented PiP visual modifications.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.1 [Information Systems]: Information Storage and
Retrieval—Content Analysis and Indexing ; I.4 [Image Pro-
cessing and Computer Vision]: General
General Terms
Security, Content-Based Image Retrieval
Keywords
SIFT, Forensics, Picture in Picture, Image Database, Visual
Modifications
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1. INTRODUCTION
Content-Based Image Retrieval Systems (CBIRS) get in-
creasingly involved in various multimedia forensics applica-
tions. They mainly perform automatic detection of sen-
sitive contents like illegal copies of copyrighted material,
child pornography images or terrorist images and videos
propaganda. Their central role can be explained by the re-
cent progress made by the technology they use. CBIRS are
very efficient, allowing extremely fast recognition even when
managing collections containing several million images [13].
They have very good recognition capabilities as they iden-
tify images that are similar to a query despite rather severe
visual modifications such as crops, rotations, scale changes,
compressions, . . .
Recognition wise, Picture in Picture are among the most
difficult visual modifications to cope with. A Picture in Pic-
ture (PiP) visual modification tries to preclude the recog-
nition of a copyrighted picture by inserting a downscaled
version of that picture inside another innocuous and dis-
tracting large scale picture.1 The identification of the copy-
righted picture tends to fail because the recognition of the
distracting image dominates. According to the specifications
of the TRECVID competition as well as the results obtained
by many research teams worldwide [20], coping with PiP is
probably the hardest task when doing content-based copy
detection. For a fair evaluation, TRECVID produces a set
of PiP modifications challenging the competitors’ CBIRS.
In general, PiP modifications (by TRECVID or anyone else)
are created in a quite generic way, independently of the sys-
tems that will later battle them. This image modification
process typically belongs to a set of generic content trans-
formations used to benchmark recognition robustness.
Assessing the performance of systems from a robustness
point of view is mainstream in the Computer Vision or Mul-
timedia literature. None of these communities explored the
performance of systems from a security perspective, however.
The security of a CBIRS is its ability to resist to some ded-
icated attacks led by malicious pirates against the specific
techniques this system uses. Recently, a handful of papers
have warned the community about the poor security levels
of CBIRS [11, 5, 7]. These papers describe various strate-
gies endangering the recognition capabilities of systems re-
1Inserting a copyrighted video inside a distracting video
raises very similar issues. The PiP term we use here refers
to both problems.
lying on SIFT [18] for recognition. These strategies produce
very specific visual modifications that are SIFT aware, i.e.,
which fully benefit from a deep knowledge of SIFT internals
to minimize visual distortion while dramatically reducing
descriptor matching.
This paper adopts a security point of view on the Pic-
ture in Picture visual modifications. Instead of producing
PiP images in a generic way, we propose a technique pro-
ducing PiP attacks able to delude the recognition capabil-
ities of a system using SIFT, running high-dimensional k -
nn (nearest neighbors) searches and final geometrical ver-
ification steps. Note that SIFT, k -nn and geometry are
state-of-the-art building blocks of many real-life copyright
oriented CBIRS. In a nutshell, existing PiP attacks embed
the severely scaled-down version of the protected image in
a distractor, which dominates recognition. Our attacking
scheme does the opposite: it embeds a very small distractor
image patch inside the (full-resolution) protected picture.
That small patch is carefully determined such that it will
catch almost all matches avoiding the full resolution image
to be identified, hence deluding recognition.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly de-
scribes how PiP visual modification schemes are created and
how existing CBIRS recognize contents despite PiP. Sec-
tion 3 describes how are produced these security-oriented
PiP visual modifications. Section 4 shows the effectiveness
of the proposed scheme through large scale image recogni-
tion experiments. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. PIP VISUAL MODIFICATIONS
This section gives a brief overview of the typical process
that eventually creates a Picture in Picture visual modifica-
tion. It then discusses about the two families of solutions
found in the literature recognizing contents despite PiP at-
tacks.
The overall context assumes that a large database of con-
tents to protect has been created somehow, oﬄine. Query
images later submitted are checked against this database
and the system decides whether queries are or are not quasi-
copies of the protected contents. The system succeeds when
a quasi-copy that is indeed in the query is detected, despite
the various visual modifications it has undergone (the query
is a true positive). The system also succeeds when it asserts
that the query is a true negative. In this case the system
has not found any piece of content in the database similar
to the query because this query is indeed purely made of
innocuous material.
In contrast, the system fails when it can not detect that
a protected piece of content is in the query (false negatives)
or when it asserts that the query contains some protected
contents while it is indeed not the case (false positive). In
general, the goal of the visual modifications are to produce as
much as possible (i) false negatives precluding the detection
of protected contents and/or (ii) false positives making the
whole system unreliable in practice.
2.1 Producing PiP Visual Modifications
The way TRECVID produces PiP modifications is quite
generic and works as follows [20]. First, an image (or video)
is randomly picked from a collection of distracting contents,
in practice unlikely to match with the database of protected
material. Then, the image (or the video) that the modifi-
cation process tries to hide from recognition is scaled down
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1: Four examples from TRECVID: (a) and
(c) are the images to be protected, kept inside
the database; (b) and (d) are the corresponding
TRECVID PiP visual modifications.
and is inserted in the distracting contents. TRECVID spec-
ifies the rules driving the downscaling as well as the loca-
tion of the inserted contents. The downscaled size ranges
between half and one third of its original size; the down-
scaled protected content can be inserted at five locations,
the four corners or the center of the distracting image. Fur-
thermore, the aspect ratio of the inserted image/video is
typically fixed. TRECVID benchmark includes several hun-
dreds of such PiP material. Figure 1 shows four examples
from TRECVID. It is interesting to compute the PSNR be-
tween the original and modified versions. PSNR is natu-
rally very small as pixels are very different. In this example,
PSNR(1(a),1(b))=12.64 and PSNR(1(c),1(d))=8.35.
2.2 Recognizing Contents Despite PiP
Overall, there are two families of techniques trying to iden-
tify the protected contents embedded inside a distracting im-
age or video. The first family heavily relies on prior knowl-
edge to facilitate identification, because it knows the PiP
procedure sticks to the predefined rules. The second family
has no particular ad-hoc mechanism but rather finely ana-
lyzes the candidate list of similar material returned by the
database search during a post-processing step. We detail
these two families below.
2.2.1 Prior Knowledge for Separating Images
The first family makes use of the PiP construction rules to
separate the two images, isolating the distracting image from
the one possibly protected. Once separated, that later image
is typically up-scaled and then used to query the CBIRS.
Some image separation techniques use edge/line informa-
tion to detect the boundaries of the inserted image. The
detection typically relies on a Canny edge detector or on a
Hough transform [19, 17, 22]. In [17], a Canny edge detector
is run to locate horizontal and vertical edges which can pos-
sibly be at the boundaries of the inserted image. Candidate
regions which will later be used as queries are obtained by
grouping four edges in pairs made of two horizontal and two
vertical edges. Some candidate regions are then eliminated
according to some additional criteria such as their aspect
ratio as well as their location. Finally, the remaining candi-
date regions are extracted from the global image, up-scaled
and probe the system. The one with the highest similar-
ity score is returned as the final answer. [19] uses a Hough
transform to detect persistent strong horizontal lines from
which the candidate regions are determined.
Separating the distracting from the potentially protected
contents is somehow similar when dealing with videos [22].
In this case, Canny is run on every single frame of the video,
which in turns creates a series of detected edge images. A
time-sliding window processes consecutive edge images and
produces average edge images. A Hough transform is then
applied on these average edge images to detect persistent
lines, and short lines as well as non horizontal or vertical
lines are eliminated. The remaining lines create candidate
regions, probing the system one after the other.
Some other methods detect corners of regions instead of
lines. In [3, 2], a Sobel operator and a Laplacian kernel are
applied to video frames. Pixels in frames that are found
to be part of either horizontal or vertical edges are flagged.
The corners of candidate regions are thus the pixels in im-
ages where the maximum accumulation of edge points on
horizontal and vertical directions are found.
Other methods make an even more rough use of the prior
knowledge of the rules driving the creation of PiP visual
modifications. For example, [15] extracts from the whole
image a series of candidate regions located at the four cor-
ners as well as around the center, having sizes of 30%, 40%
and 50% of the whole image. These regions are then used
to probe the database.
Overall, these methods too much rely on the prior knowl-
edge to be usable in practice from a security perspective.
While these PiP detection techniques are somehow robust,
they are not at all secure. Once the TRECVID rules are
known, it is easy to create a PiP visual modification that
diverges enough from these rules to make recognition more
problematic. Inserting the protected content at a random
location, rotating it by few degrees or stretching it by dif-
ferent scaling factors are sufficient to delude recognition.
2.2.2 Identification Without Prior Knowledge
In contrast to the approaches mentioned above, some other
techniques do not separate the images. They rather com-
pute feature vectors over the whole image and then query
the database with every single descriptor, without separat-
ing anything [12, 9, 24, 25]. Once all the query descriptors
have probed the database, the list of candidate images is
then post-processed in order to identify the potential pro-
tected contents. This post-processing step typically checks
the geometry consistency between the query and all images
in the candidate list. Very robust tools estimating the geo-
metrical consistency are used, such as RANSAC [8, 16, 21]
or the Generalized Hough Transform [1, 18].
Three comments are in order, however. First, the feature
vectors (typically SIFT) are so powerful that the search pro-
cess is likely to put in the candidate list the protected image
corresponding to the one quasi-copied in the PiP, despite
its downscaling. Finding that image inside the list of can-
didates is thus a matter of eliminating the other candidate
images that are false positives. Second, the robustness of the
geometrical verification process is so high that if the query
indeed contains some pieces of protected contents, then it
will be classified as containing inliers (mostly, if not only).
Third, because the distracting image in the query does not
match with any image in the database, then no consistency
will be found there and the distracting part of the query
image is thus classified as containing outliers only.
These techniques strongly assume that the distracting part
of the image/video query does not belong to database—this
is a very serious drawback. Otherwise, when the distract-
ing part is in (or turns out to be in) the database, then
the result returned by the CBIRS is much more ambiguous.
When the distracting part dominates recognition then the
inserted part, also protected, is not identified. This in turn
might cause severe difficulties in applications where copy-
right holders get remunerated on a pay-per-view type-of ba-
sis. This is typically a security threat as a pirate well aware
of the details of the application as well as of the monetizing
rules can bias the system and cause a fraudulent behavior.
Like for the techniques based on a prior knowledge, it is not
a problem of robustness, but a problem of security.
3. CBIRS-AWARE PIP CREATION
In contrast to the generic way of creating PiP visual mod-
ifications, we now detail a technique producing PiP attacks
deluding the recognition capabilities of a CBIRS based on
the SIFT description, an approximate high-dimensional k -
nn search and a final geometrical verification. These three
techniques managing image description, indexing and re-
trieval as well as removing false positives are representative
of how most state-of-the-art systems work. They are used
in real-life applications because they cope with large data
collections, their recognition power is excellent, their speed
is impressive and the results they return is high quality de-
spite approximations. We first present the salient aspects
of these techniques before detailing the CBIRS-aware PiP
creation process.
3.1 Representative CBIRS Techniques
Attacking a system from the security side requires to deeply
know its internals. Like some prior works [11, 6, 4], this pa-
per aims at modifying the content of images to skew their
description such that they are hardly detected by the system.
It is therefore key to detail the SIFT image description [18].
SIFT computes local features in three steps. First, it de-
tects a keypoint located in (x, y) in the image at scale σ
if it is a local extremum of the DoG (Difference of Gaus-
sian) response. In the second step, the main orientation
θ is computed based on gradient directions locally around
(x, y). The keypoint is defined as kp = {x, y, σ, θ}. The
third step computes the descriptor on a support region cen-
tered on (x, y) and whose size depends on scale σ. The
support region is divided into 16 subregions, and the 8-bin
quantized histograms of weighted gradient orientation of the
subregions are concatenated into a 128-dimensional vector.
SIFT feature vectors are extracted from all images of the
database and then inserted into an high-dimensional index,
oﬄine. Due to the curse of dimensionality, indexing is ap-
proximate to achieve good performance by trading-off result
quality for response time. When a user submits a query to
the system, its features vectors are first extracted and an
approximate k -nn search is run for each query vector. Each
database vector found during this process then votes for the
Figure 2: Example of an image after the full washing
process. PSNR=30.03
Washing Step # keypoints # matches
Original image 1034 1034
Reducing Density 910 833
Changing Orientations 961 505
Local Smoothing 694 115
Table 1: Number of keypoints and number of
matches between the washed images and their orig-
inal counterparts. Average on 1,000 images.
database image it has been extracted from. This eventually
gives a list of candidate similar images along with scores.
A final step checks the geometric consistency of these can-
didate images with the query. This re-ranks the candidate
images. The scores of the images in this list as well as their
degree of geometrical consistency allows the CBIRS to de-
cide whether or not the query contains protected content.
Overall, it can be seen that the ability of the CBIRS to
correctly match descriptors has a direct impact on the final
decision. The more different the descriptors are between im-
ages, the less likely they will be found similar by the system.
The goal of the security-oriented PiP visual modification is
therefore to eventually produce descriptors extracted from
the quasi-copy that are as much as possible different from
the one extracted from the image to protect while minimiz-
ing the visual distortion. Following the guidelines of [6, 4],
two approaches can achieve this goal. The first one tries
to remove as much keypoints as possible from the image to
hide—fewer keypoints make matching less marked; the sec-
ond one does not touch keypoints but touches their support
regions to end up with quite different high-dimensional SIFT
descriptors. Both techniques are summarized below.
3.2 Image Washing Before PiP
As proposed in [6, 4], a forged copy of a protected im-
age is ‘washed’ to reduce as much as possible the number
of matches between that forged copy and its original ver-
sion. First, the regions of keypoints density in the quasi-
copy (called image I) are identified using a window of size
(50×50) sliding over I. When more than 60 SIFT-keypoints
exist in that window, then the whole region in the image is
smoothed by Gaussian function with σ equals 1.3.
The washing carries on by manipulating the support re-
gions of the remaining keypoints. [4] modifies the value of
the pixels in some of these regions in order to change their
dominant orientation in a non affine-way, since SIFT absorbs
affine transforms. For every keypoint, it determines how the
pixels in the support region should be changed for shifting its
orientation by at least pi/6. This, in turn, ensures that the
descriptors computed from this tweaked support region and
from the original support region are far enough in the high-
dimensional space. The changes are applied in the picture
if the PSNR computed between the original and tweaked
support regions does not drop below a threshold.
Finally, a small, very local, smoothing is done where there
remain some unmodified keypoints, hoping each is after-
wards not anymore a local extremum of the DoG. Again,
here, PSNR is checked to avoid too severe visual distortions.
Overall, after washing, the forged copy of a protected im-
age has (i) few descriptors that perfectly match with its orig-
inal version, (ii) many descriptors that are unlikely to match
since they have been moved away in the high-dimensional
space and (iii) several new keypoints created as side ef-
fects due to visual artifacts that may or may not match [7].
Querying the CBIRS with such a washed image is likely
to identify the original but with a very low score, making
the system less confident. Figure 2 and Table 1 illustrate
this process. Table 1 gives the average number of keypoints
that are detected in the various washed versions of 1,000 im-
ages. It also gives the average number of matches between a
washed image and its original counterpart determined using
Lowe’s criterion [18].
3.3 Creating the PiP Attack
Washing even more reduces the number of keypoints that
still match with their original counterpart and breaks recog-
nition. Yet, so severely washed images are much too dis-
torted to remain usable in practice and keep any commercial
value. In contrast, as highlighted in the Section 2, making
sure the distracting part dominates the recognition is one
option; making it difficult to separate the two images is an-
other. For these reasons, our scheme for producing CBIRS-
aware PiP attacks adopts the following guidelines:
• The relative locations of the protected contents and the
distracting part have to be as free as possible. Corners
and centers should not be the only options.
• The frontier between the protected and the distracting
contents must not boil down to straight segments (this
includes not being strictly vertical/horizontal).
• The distracting part must always strongly match with
some contents that is protected in the database, even
if the contents of this database remains absolutely un-
known. Making sure the recognition has ambiguities is
key to this attack scheme.
• The PSNR computed between the original image and
its forgery must be high to preserve visual quality.
From these guidelines, our PiP attack inserts inside the
image to be forged a small visual patch carefully determined
such that it is extremely likely to strongly match with some
of the (unknown) contents of the database. What follows
describes how such visual patches are determined, how they
are inserted into the images and why more than one patch
might be inserted.
3.3.1 Determining Candidate Visual Patches
After washing, the forged image still contains several key-
points matching with their original counterparts in the orig-
inal, non washed image. To make sure this original image
does not get ranked first by the CBIRS, more matches than
this number must be created between another image from
the database of protected contents and some visual elements
in the query image. Furthermore, there must be a good ge-
ometrical consistency between these matching keypoints to
pass the geometrical verification.
It is easy to identify such matches when the database of
protected contents is known. First, the contents to be pro-
tected might be copyrighted material such as blockbusters
or other images that are somehow known from everyone.
Second, the CBIRS might return images that are similar to
the ones used for querying the system. In this case, it is
possible to patiently send queries and accumulate results.
Analyzing these disclosed images bootstraps the creation
of CBIRS-aware PiP attacks. First, these images are seg-
mented according to the keypoint density and only dense
enough regions are kept. Then, each dense region is repeat-
edly cropped around its center to create small square visual
patches of 10× 10 pixels, 15× 15, 20× 20, . . . . This, some-
how, creates a dictionary of visual patches that are sorted by
the number of keypoints still matching their origin image af-
ter cropping.2 Then, we select a patch from this dictionary
containing more keypoints than the number of remaining
matching keypoints after the washing of the forgery. In-
serting this patch in the washed image is going to produce
enough geometrically consistent matches to push the orig-
inal image down in the result list (at least with rank #2,
see 3.3.4).
In some applications, it might be impossible to disclose
what is inside the database. It is however possible to create
a set of visual patches that are extremely likely to match
with some images from this unknown database. Many im-
ages include textures that are very repetitive, such as tiles,
bricks, tree leaves, window shutters, windows on a facade
seen from far enough, friezes, fabrics, clothes, etc. Down-
loading a fair number of pictures from Flickr provides an
easy way to bootstrap the construction of a dictionary of
keypoint-dense visual patches, as described above. These
patches typically contain regular and repetitive patterns.
The pirate bets that these patterns will match with some
of the database images even if no images from the database
are known. Furthermore, it is likely these patches will be ge-
ometrically consistent with some of the database contents.
Overall, our strategy starts by building a dictionary of
visual patches. Examples are given in the Table 2. Patches
have different sizes since their keypoint density varies. It
then picks from the dictionary the patches that have more
keypoints than what remains in the washed image. This
gives a list of candidate patches. The next sections describe
the selection of one or more patches in that list and their
insertion in the washed image.
3.3.2 Inserting a Visual Patch
We define four policies for determining where a visual
patch is inserted inside the washed image. In contrast to
2For example, a 50×50 pixels cropped patch containing 400
keypoints has only 300 matches with its origin image. The
difference comes from the keypoints near the borders of the
patch which can not match anymore.
# of Visual Examples
keypoints
50–100
100–200
200–300
300–400
400–500
Table 2: Dictionary of Keypoint-Dense Visual
Patches.
TRECVID, the insertion is not driven by a simple rule, but
rather by the content of the washed image, and therefore its
place significantly varies from one image to the other. For
simplicity, we detail the policies assuming there is only one
patch candidate for insertion.
Policy #1: PSNR-Oriented.
The first policy finds the place in the washed image where
the patch can be inserted while reducing the PSNR as little
as possible. Let Iw be the washed image into which the
patch Ip has to be inserted, eventually producing the image
I ′w. Ip is a p × p pixel square. First, Ip is turned into a
column vector, centered I˜p = Ip − I¯p, with I¯p denoting the
average luminance. I˜p is then sled over the washed image.
Because SIFT is invariant to illumination changes (provided
the local contrast is not too small), it is possible to adjust
the illumination of I˜p to be as close as possible to Iw(x, y, p)
the p×p region of Iw around position (x, y). This boils down
to finding parameter a and b such that:
min
a,b
‖aI˜p + b− Iw(x, y, p)‖
2, subject to: a ≥ amin. (1)
The constraint a ≥ amin avoids small values of a which
flattens I˜p removing most (if not all) of its keypoints. Solv-
ing (1) gives a and b:
b = I¯w(x, y, p),
a = max
 
amin,
I˜p
T
Iw(x, y, p)
‖I˜p‖2
!
. (2)
Once the best illumination of I˜p is determined at position
(x, y), the PSNR between aI˜p + b and Iw(x, y, p) is com-
puted. Once I˜p has been sled all over Iw, it is inserted at
the place where the maximum PSNR was observed. At that
time, after having inserted the patch I˜p with the appropri-
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 3: Illustrating the four patch insertion poli-
cies. (a), (b), (c) and (d) are Policies #1 to #4,
respectively. PSNR are respectively 29.13, 24.77,
29.11, 25.14. (e) shows the map of salient regions
found using GBVS. (f) gives in white the area where
high-saliency forbids patch insertion
ate values for a and b, the washed image becomes I ′w. This
policy tends to insert Ip in poorly textured regions.
Policy#2: Matching Density-Oriented.
The second policy determines where to insert based on
the number of matches that still exist between the washed
image Iw and its original, non modified version. It moves a
sliding window of size p × p over Iw to identify the region
with a maximum of matches. Then, Ip is centered, a and b
are determined as in Policy#1 and then aI˜p + b replaces the
appropriate region of Iw. Generating I
′
w this way tends to
dramatically reduce the number of matches, making recog-
nition harder.
Policy#3: Visual Attention-Oriented & PSNR.
Care must be taken to move away the patch from be-
ing inserted in the middle of, or close to, the visual cen-
ters of interest that exist in the image. This third policy
therefore computes a visual saliency map for Iw using the
Graph-Based Visual Saliency (GBVS) approach [10]. Pol-
icy#3 then simply determines salient-enough regions and
then applies Policy#1, forbidding the sliding window to en-
ter inside these regions.
Policy#4: Visual Attention & Matching Density.
Once the salient-enough regions have been determined,
then Policy#2 is applied. This inserts the patch where
the largest number of matching keypoints is found, outside
salient regions.
3.3.3 Blurring Boundaries
Systems separating pictures to cope with PiP attacks heav-
ily rely on horizontal and vertical segment detection. Chal-
lenging their security is possible by modifying the images
such that detecting such segments becomes very difficult.
One option is to blur the boundaries separating the two im-
ages. After inserting the patch, a small and local Gaussian
(σ = 1) blurring around the frontier does the job. Then,
vertical and horizontal edges are much harder to detect.
3.3.4 Inserting Multiple Visual Patches
Inserting one patch in the washed image pushes the cor-
responding original image at least at rank #2 in the result
list. It might be desirable to push it further. In this case,
several patches might be inserted in the washed image. Two
inserted patches push the original image to rank#3, etc. Of
course, it is not possible to push it extremely far without
too severely degrading the washed image. Figure 3 shows
examples where two patches have been inserted.
4. LARGE-SCALE EXPERIMENTS
In order to validate our CBIRS-aware PiP attacking schemes,
we ran experiments with real images and with a real fully
functioning CBIRS. We first present the evaluation setup
before discussing the lessons learned from the experiments.
4.1 Dataset, Queries and Setup
We created an image collection composed of 100,000 ran-
dom pictures downloaded from Flickr that are very diverse
in contents. All images have been resized to 512 pixels on
their longer edge. We then randomly picked 1,000 of these
images to use them as query images. We also used a large set
of random images to build the dictionary of visual patches.
We computed the local description of these images using
the open-source SIFT-VLFeat code by Vedaldi [23]. The col-
lection yields 103,454,566 SIFT-VLFeat descriptors. These
descriptors are indexed by the NV-Tree high-dimensional in-
dexing scheme [14] which runs approximate k-nearest neigh-
bor queries. The NV-Tree returns a candidate list of the
best 100 matching images.
That list is then processed in order to rerank candidates
based on their degree of geometrical consistency with the
query image. This process iteratively takes one candidate
image, determines which of its descriptors are matching with
the query using Lowe’s criterion [18]. This checks whether
the Euclidean distance ratio between matching descriptors
and their nearest neighbor is below 0.8. The matching de-
scriptors are the inputs of a Hough transform model esti-
mation in order to measure the geometric consistency of
the matches. The mean square error is used to keep the
best model. The number of inliers for this model is used to
rerank the 100 candidate images.
4.2 Experiment 1: Inserting One Patch
In this first experiment, we first wash the 1,000 query
images and then determine which patch should be inserted
in each washed image. We then insert patches in images
Policies PSNR rank=1 rank=2 rank>100
#1-PSNR 29.55 25 923 47
#2-Matching Dens. 28.14 17 921 60
#3-Visual Att. 29.52 20 928 46
& PSNR
#4-Visual Att. 28.35 13 918 63
& Matching Dens.
Table 3: Counting observed ranks of identified im-
ages, 1 patch, varying policies.
according to the four patch-insertion policies defined above,
eventually ending-up with 4,000 CBIRS-aware PiP attacked
images. Each attacked image is used to query the database.
We first discuss the effectiveness of the attacks before giving
details on the patches used to produce these attacks.
4.2.1 Effectiveness of the Attacks
Table 3 shows the effectiveness results of this experiment
for each of the four policies as given by the first column. The
second column gives the average PSNR between the original
images and their attacked version, for the four policies.
The third column gives the number of times the PiP attack
was not successful since the washed and attacked images
could still be identified by the system and be ranked first. It
turns out that some images can not be attacked in practice
while preserving their PSNR. They are too much textured,
still have too many unchanged keypoints after washing and
would require the insertion of huge visual patches to topple
over recognition. Note the failure rate is very small (1.88%,
roughly, across policies).
The fourth column of the Table gives the number of times
the original image is found at rank #2 in the final result.
In this case, the PiP attack is successful. The washing
was strong enough to dramatically reduce the number of
(good) matches and the picked visual patch triggered enough
matches (geometrically consistent) to dominate recognition.
The fifth column gives the number of times the original
image is not found in the 100 most similar images. This hap-
pens when the washing removes enough keypoints and/or
triggers matches with other random images from the database
in addition to what produces the patches.3
Overall, we observe that identifying the original image
after the CBIRS-aware PiP attacks is always problematic,
the system having to deal with recognition ambiguities or
being unable to identify the correct images. This is a very
encouraging result.
4.2.2 Details on Patches
In addition to keeping track of image similarities for deter-
mining the effectiveness of the attacks, we recorded detailed
information on the patches used to create the PiP visual
modifications. Figure 4 shows the number of times patches
having the sizes given by the x-axis were used to produce
the 1,000 attacks in the case of Policy#1 (PSNR-oriented),
quantized every 5 pixels. Figure 5 shows the impact on the
PSNR of using patches of varying sizes. Overall, this shows
that most patches are smaller than 50×50 pixels, which is to
contrast with images that are typically 512×384. Of course
this in turn reduces the PSNR. It is interesting to observe
that in some cases very small patches are picked from the
3Note that on average 4.75 original images were ranked be-
tween 3 and 100.
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dictionary: their keypoint density is very high and they tend
to contain small repetitive visual patterns such as clothes or
bricks. We conducted that same study with the three other
policies without seeing any significant changes.
4.3 Experiment 2: Inserting Two Patches
This experiment demonstrates that it is possible to in-
crease the rank of the original image by inserting more than
one patch. This allows to make even more difficult the
identification of the protected picture as (potentially) many
other unrelated pictures dominate recognition. Table 4 gives
effectiveness results when inserting two patches in the im-
ages, varying the policies. This table reads as the one given
above. Here, the original image is (almost) never ranked first
(col 3), occasionally ranked #2 (col 4), very often ranked
#3 as desired (col 5). In addition, it is quite often not even
found among the 100 most similar images (col 6). Note that
on average 2.25 original images were ranked between 4 and
100.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper is showing that creating Picture in Picture
visual modifications from a security perspective is seriously
Policies PSNR rank=1 rank=2 rank=3 rank>100
#1-PSNR 28.93 0 32 691 274
#2-Matching Dens. 26.80 0 15 653 331
#3-Visual Att. & PSNR 28.89 1 29 686 282
#4-Visual Att.& Matching Dens. 27.10 0 11 593 393
Table 4: Counting observed ranks of identified images, 2 patches, varying policies.
challenging the recognition power of CBIRS using techniques
that are representative of the state-of-the-art. This is demon-
strated by the evaluations made with a large database of
100,000 real images together with a real system using SIFT,
k -nn and checking the geometrical consistency of matches.
While the PiP creation scheme and the various policies de-
tailed here are able to delude the system, substantial ad-
ditional work is needed to reduce the visual impact when
washing images as well as when inserting carefully chosen
visual patches. It is likely inpainting methods will help pre-
serving the visual quality of the attacked images. It is part
of our plans to go one step beyond what is presented in this
paper by integrating our security-oriented CBIRS attacks
with inpainting strategies.
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